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RESTRAINT ECONOMICS AND THE NEW RIGHT:
A Structural Analysis of the Political
Economy of Social Services Cutbacks

John Butcher
University of British Columbia
Department of Geography

ABSTRACT

Restraint by government in the area of
social service spending in the 1980's has
become an issue of grave concern for social
service practitioners, planners, and administrators.
The emergence in North America of
neo-conservative economic policies has engendered a body of critical and provocative literature which examines the effects of "restraint
economics".
Recent work in geography has sought to
locate the supply-side trend within a framework of macro-level processes.
These suggest
that a declining public commitment to maintaining the social safety net is linked to
broader structural changes in the workplace
and spatial shifts of capital and industry
(Dear & Clark 1981, Peet 1983, Soja et al
1983, Ross R. 1983).
These trends have not been as well documented in Canada. Yet, there is much to suggest that policies introduced by the British
Columbia government in 1983 reflect, on a
regional scale, the same patterns and processes inferred by geographers in the U.S. context.
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Introduction
Fiscal restraint has, in recent years,
become a fundament of the social policies of
many Western Governments. This paper examines
issues of restraint economics in a general way
while making reference to political events
experienced in British columbia, Canada, from
May 1983 to March, 1984.
The intent is to
derive, from the British Columbia (B.C.) situation, a framework for some generalizations
about the emerging character of the Western
capitalist state, the collectivist-conservative debate, and the political and ideological
struggles which coalesce around the target of
much restraint legislation - social services.
For heuristic purposes, the Marxist framework provides the most cogent analytical approach for the identification of the structure
of social and political relations inherent in
these issues.
Current events in B.C. may be
interpreted within the parameters of a political economy analysis which holds as a critical
variable the tensions and contradictions which
prevail between
capital, the mode of production, and labour. In concert with this dialectic, the attendant consciousness which pertains to the right and left of the political
spectrum are also considered. The following
discussion does not attempt a chronology of
the Social Credit government legislation and
the consequent labour confrontation, rather,
specific elements of the legislation are drawn
to illustrate the structure and process of the
political relations of capital as expressed in
recent North American experience.
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Setting the Scene
On May 5, 1983, the incumbent Social
Credit government of Premier William Bennett
was returned for its third consecutive term at
the helm of the province of British columbia.
The Social Credit Party has a long history in
Western Canadian Politics and runs on a strong
pro-business, "free enterprise" platform.
Premier Bennett, armed with a considerable
parliamentary majority in the legislature,
began to act immediately to reduce public
expenditures and raise provincial revenues as
part of a restorative plan for the ailing
The government intends to
provincial economy.
encourage increases in private sector investment, in part, by a downsizing of government
bureaucracy and through deregulation in the
market place and in the area of labour/human
rights.
On July 7, 1983, the government brought
down twenty-six new pieces of legislation
Charactalong with a new provincial budget.
erized by the government as a "restraint package", the scope of this set of policies constituted a radical departure from what had
hitherto been a pattern of incremental growth
in social programs and sought economic recovery through the provision of an environment
attractive to private investors. Dubbed the
"recovery program", the aim of this set of
policies, in the words of Premier Bennett, is
"to make B.C. a place in Canada and North
America where business and industry will find
it profitable to employ our people" (Vancouver
Sun, Oct. 15, 1983).
In pursuit of this goal, the legislative
agenda includes provisions such as property
tax breaks; less commitment to protect the
rights of unionized employees; less enforce-

865

ment of existing human rights provisions (and
lower penalties for breaching them); the abolition of rent controls; and the elimination of
the office of the Rentalsman, a body through
which landlord-tenant disputes were mediated.
The legislation package also includes a bill
which restricts the power of regional districts by centralizing municipal planning
function in the provincial capital, Victoria.
This legislation gives the province greater
control over the management of development and
investment and will appeal to investors anxious to avoid costly delays caused by the adjudication process of municipal planning offices.
The tough new policies of the provincial
government also saw reductions in monetary
transfers to non-profit social service agencies; reductions in welfare payments to some
classes of recipient; and the elimination of
government-delivered services to certain
groups, among them, women, children, and tenants. As such, these policies entailed a reordering of government priorities from the
maintenance of the social safety net to removing the obstructions to investment.
The government also put into motion a plan to reduce
the provincial civil service by 25 percent,
and imposed restrictions on public sector
unions and salaries, thereby signalling to
business that taxes would be kept down and the
interests of the market place protected.
However, while in the government's view,
the environment for capital investment thrives
upon the removal of roadblocks such as intransigent unions and "excessive" social spending,
their efforts backfired through the creation
of an unstable political climate in the province, characterized by a labour-government
antagonism which would have alarmed many investors.
The traditionally militant public
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sector unions,

in a coalition with community,

labour, and political groups, and with the
endorsement of professional association and
private sector unions, galvanized support for
a province-wide general strike.
The strike, orchestrated under the banner,
"Operation Solidarity", resulted in a political crisis for the government and threatened
to escalate with private sector unions pulling
their workers off the job, effectively shutting-down the entire province. While a chronicle of the strike is an interesting study of
decision making and negotiation under siege,
the intention of this paper is not to present
a political diary of events.
It is important
to note, however, that in the legislative
session preceding the strike, the government
had attempted what many analysts regarded as
"legislation by fiat". The government invoked
"closure" on more than twenty occasions,
thereby stifling all debate on the bills before the house - an unprecedented exertion of
political will - and the sitting culminated in
the physical ejection of the Leader of the
Opposition on the directive of the Deputy
Speaker.
The Leader of the Opposition was
subsequently banned from the Legislature.
The tone was set. Confrontation was to be
the dominant mode of political action in the
ensuing weeks and to the social and financial
costs inherent in the re-ordering of government priorities was to be added the cost of
two-week escalating public service strike. On
November 13, 1983, relative clam was once
again restored through concession and agreements by the government promising more open
consultation not only on matters of wages and
tenure, but upon the structure of the restraint package as a whole. The negotiations
between "Operation Solidarity" leaders and the
British Columbia Government included human
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rights, tenant's issues and other servicerelated programs which were being reduced of
Some of the
eliminated by the legislation.
content of the legislation so far mentioned
Much of it has already
has been altered.
passed into law. While there was concession
on both sides, the fundamental issues are far
from resolved and, at this writing, the prospects for a labour peace in British Columbia
seem tenuous at best.

The Polemics of Restraint

The evolving political scene in B.C. has
sparked a flurry of political analysis and
prognosis, the retrenching of both reactionary
and revolutionary sentiment, and has provoked
the concern of academics and health and welfare professionals. The unemployed, students,
women, children, the disabled and native Indians have felt the sting of restraint, as
have unionized workers, provincial employees,
and even university faculties faced with reduced budgets and a threatened repeal of the
tenure system. The controversy has renewed
discussion of the political philosophies of
right and left, one aspect of which is a
desire to infer from local and national events
the structure, both existent and emergent, of
national and global capitalist social relations.
It is relevant, here, to mention the "political psychology" of the restraint package,
especially as the debate has polarized around
the philosophical constructions of social
provision and the role of the State.
The
provincial budget and the attendant legislation has been touted by the Social Credit
Party as an effort to "get government off the
backs of the people". While it is question-
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able just which "people" are intended here, it
is important to bear in mind that in the "new
right" political view, typified by the governments of Regan and Thatcher, the unrestrained
market offers the best potential for public
security via "filter-down" effects flowing
from an invigorated private sector.
Of
course, the strongest caveat which arises in
opposition to such a view is that the free
market model offers few incentives for the
equitable redistribution of what Kirby (1982,
1983) refers to as the "public wage" - those
benefits which derive from a pool of collective resources.
In a televised address to the province on
October 20, 1983, Premier Bennett explained
his governments plan for "renewed prosperity:
To reach beyond our border, for
new investments, new industries and
new technologies, requires a coordinated strategy. Because we cannot
spend our way out of the recession, we
will have to earn our way out of it...
We must encourage investment, and must
encourage risk-taking.
(Vancouver Sun, Oct. 21, 1983)
The Social Credit government, in a Party
publication entitled "Recovery 83"
(T.
Segarty, M.L.A. 1983), perceives itself as
responding to the "fierce competition for
world markets" by long-term expansion of the
"window of opportunity: for the province. In
this same publication, a very telling assertion typifies the new-conservative leanings of
the Social Credit Party vis-a-vis the collectivist stance of the opposition New Democratic
Party (N.D.P). Regarding the elimination of
"Child Abuse Teams" which operated under the
auspices of the Ministry of Human Resources,
this "information" publication says:

869

We know the N.D.P. thrives on
human misery. They'd like everybody
to be dependent on government because
when people are dependent, they're
more susceptible to their brand of
fear tactics.
(T. Segarty, 1983:15)
On the other side of the debate, critics
of the government have labelled its policies
as "revenge", claiming that the legislation
is, in part, an effort to punish public sector
unions and dismantle programs in produced by
the former N.D. P government (Vancouver Sun,
October 15, 1983).
Dr Paul Tennant, professor
of political science at the University of
British Columbia, claims that "ideological
vengance" is a major motive behind the legislative package. Tennant refers to the legislation as a "reorganization of priorities",
given an economic rationale, and notes that
while money is being saved on programs the
government does not like, "significantly more
money is being directed into programs the
government does like" (Vancouver Sun, October
25, 1983).
Underlying the proposals, says
Tennant, is the "centralization of power with
the government itself, in the premier's office".
Tennant further observes that the
government has succeeded in "setting
the vocabulary" and that
"who ever sets
the vocabulary wins the debate" (Vancouver Sun, October
25, 1983).
The rhetoric arising out of B.C.'s political turmoil has not lacked for its measure of
vitriol. Still, for all the polemical excesses from left and right, the theatrics behind
the debate serve to define the roles of the
various actors. New Democratic Party M.L.A.
(Member of the Legislative Assembly) Gordon
Hanson referred to the Social Credit proposals
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as "ideological provocations" which would have
damaging reprecussions for both the province
and those disadvantaged sectors of the population who can least withstand the effects of
cutbacks in services (Vancouver Sun, October
21, 1983).
Professor T.T. Paterson of the
School of Business Administration, Simon
Fraser University, writes:
The government has turned to a
procedure of eliminating several services...that would be regarded as of
considerable public value:
helping
the poor, the infirm, the unfortunate.
That method of reducing government,
"cutting out unprofitable lines", is
typical of business practice, where it
is rightly applied.
But the public
service is not a business, and its
"lines" shouldn't be measured in money
terms. To that extent government is
failing in its public duty and has
failed to follow up its first approach
on productivity.
(Letter to the Editor, Vancouver Sun,
October 15, 1983).
N.D.P. Human Resources critic, Rosemary
Brown, sees the restraint program as a sign of
further moves against public sector workers in
the rest of Canada:
My fear is that B.C. is not
only an aberation but a hint of things
to come... The B.C. government is
clearly reactionary and anti-union,
anti-elderly, anti-disabled, antiwomen and anti-people in general.
(Vancouver Sun, October 27, 1983).
Federal LIberal Party President,
Iona
Campagonla also regards the "politics of the
right' with some alarm:
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B.C.

is the political distant

early warning line for Canada just as
surely as California has been the
birthing place for Reaganite extremism
in the United States.
(Vancouver Sun, October 17, 1983).
On the other side, party supporters at the
Social Credit annual convention in October
labelled the persons behind "Operation Solidarity" as "communist infiltrators" (Vancouver
Sun, October 15, 1983).
In the same vein, an
address by outgoing president of the Social
Credit Women's Auxiliary, Barbara Foxwell,
regarded opposition to the government's legislation as a "battle" which, if lost, "will
mean the destruction of democracy as we know
it."
(Vancouver Sun, October 14, 1983).
Restraint:

Economic Chimera or Political RedHerring?

When public or private social service
agencies are singled out for cutbacks in staff
or funding, it becomes problematic to deliver
social services and yet maintain an acceptable
level of service quality. There are several
measures of efficiency and effectiveness commonly employed in this regard, each with its
own inherent difficulties of accuracy and
depth. Although it is inappropriate here to
examine the various of program efficiency, it
is important to realize that the provincial
government in B.C. is actively promoting a

private market model of "productivity" when
assessing the worth of programs.

Government cutbacks have proceeded on the
assumption that churches, voluntary agencies,
local governments and families are not only
willing, but able to "pick up" services form-
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erly offered by the province.
The Social
Credit Party seems to adhere to this assumption as an article of faith, ignoring the fact
that current levels of voluntary sector provision have been achieved through increased
dependency on government funding. Neither can
local governments "step into the breach",
constrained as they are by a limited tax base.
Nor is it reasonable to expect lower levels of
government or the private sector to assume
responsibility for the accelerated breadth and
severity of social problems in the province.
The second highest rate of unemployment in
Canada (15.7 percent for April, 1983) coupled
with overall reductions in public and private
social service capability, and further restrictions on eligibility for social assistance
have created a strain on the formal service
network - evidenced by the proliferation of
food banks in the urban areas of the province.
Added to this are the apprehensions of clients
and service professionals regarding the "privatization" of services formerly under provincial auspice. A range of services for women,
children, and the mentally handicapped have
been tendered for contract to the non-profit
and the entrepreneurial sectors without the
benefit of any rigorous criteria for standards
of service.
In an analysis of the budget speech by the
Minister of Finance, Dobell (1983) isolates
two main concepts which are often repeated: 1)
the government's ability to pay; and 2) the
concept of productivity. Applied to public
sector human services, Dobell asserts that
neither concept can bear the weight put on
them (Dobell 1983:7).
In this regard, Doyle
(1979) observes that economic analyses of
social services or policies are inadequate to
assess their worth and need - all benefits
cannot be included in their calculation be-
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cause in terms of effectiveness and organization, they are totally unlike any entrepreneurial activity (Doyle 1979:53).
Rational
budgeting approaches are based more on satisfying the needs of the system (supplier) than
they are on the needs of the consumer (Doyle
1979:54). In fact, it is commonly remarked by
voluntary sector workers that the accountability and monitoring structures imposed on them
by government funding bodies often form the
basis of the rationale for budgetary cuts,
despite the ambiguities of the assessment
system itself. The inference is, of course,
that economic or productivity rationales may
become convenient mechanisms to facilitate
political as opposed to rational decisions.
What has been consistently ignored by the
advocates of recession economics are the costs
- personal, social and monetary - of cutbacks
in publicly mandated services. A report prepared by the B.C. Association of Social
Workers entitled Loosening the Fabric (1983)
examines the public and private costs inherent
in the termination of a Family Support Worker
Program. The report notes that, while the
program, designed to avoid the removal of
children from their families, represented only
0.49 percent of the total Ministry of Human
Resources (M.H.R.) budget, the costs of replacement services such as special care foster
homes, alternative schools, house arrest,
detention and court appearances are vastly in
excess of the current expenditures for a preventive program (Currie and Pishalsk, 1983).
Subsidized Legal Aid has also been drastically
reduced in B.C., which, when combined with the
loss of the office of the Rentalsman, the
Human Rights Branch and Budget cutbacks in the
office of the provincial Ombudsman, severely
limits the accessibility of the poor or the
near poor to avenues of appeal or redress.
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There is a widely held view among social
service professionals in B.C. that the devolution of public responsibility for social services will have several negative effects: 1)
privatization will lead to an overall reduction in the quality of service; 2) services
will become increasingly residual and remedial; 3) agencies will respond increasingly
to political rather than social contingencies;
4) patterns of social inequity will broaden
and deepen; 5) the availability of adequate
service will constrict while the net costs of
social problems to the province and the federal government will rise as a result of individual problem regression and problem diversion. Jack MacDonald, of the University of
British Columbia School of Social Work, has
addressed this set of effects with regard to
family-oriented programs in the province:
In July of this year, it was
announced by the Minister of Human
Resources that these various Ministry
programs of family support would be
discontinued as part of the Government's program of fiscal restraint.
Our Association has protested this
initiative on the basis that it will
place more children in jeopardy in the
short run and be more costly to society in the longer term. However, we
also wish to draw to public attention
that the discontinuation of these
programs reflects an abandonment of
public responsibility for needed child
welfare services at a critical period
in the history of the province
(MacDonald "Child Protection Services
and Privatization: A Proposed Position
Statement for B.C.A.S.W.", 1983 unpublished.
These concerns hint strongly at many of
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the problems of the market place model of
social service delivery. While Governments
who espouse the free-market ethic continually
exhort the private sector to assume responsibility for service "gaps", they do not provide a framework to facilitate the process.
There has, in British Columbia, been a paucity
of rational planning by government and little,
if any, research exploring the possible hidden
costs of the cessation of programs. The devolution of mandated services and public responsibility has not been accompanied by a decentralization of decision making authority and
while the government claims that privatization
will enhance the power of the consumer of
services, there has been no effort at consultation with client or community groups.
As one begins to look beyond the philosophical rhetoric and beyond the appeals to
restraint, one begins to form an impression
that the fiscal policy of government is something more than a response to issues of
dollars and cents. While there are serious
problems with revenue and administration in
all government departments, those programs
targeted for restraint seem to be assessed
more on the basis of philosophical criteria
than the imperatives of rational management.
There appears to be a pervasive notion among
proponents of the "right" that dollars spent
on social welfare are lost to the economy.
The social returns, for example, of preventive
programs for juvenile offenders, seem not to
enter into the political or economic accounting of government ministers. Certainly, not
all of the organizational or management alternatives for a more rational social service
have been explored - many, one might postulate, have not been considered simply because
they are ideologically untenable.
In a perceptive analysis of the B.C. ex-
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perience, Dobell (1983) asserts that restraint
Government rhetoric
is not really the issue.
not withstanding, the July 7th budget, with a
nominal growth of 12.3 percent (well over
twice the rate of inflation) represented a
real growth in excess of all other provincial
governments and in excess of B.C.'s own record
In
for the past 30 years (Dobell 1983:4).
fact, Dobell projects the net savings as a
result of the cutbacks will fall short of the
He goes
figures projected by the government.
further in saying that both the use of revenues and the size of revenues are products of
political judgements which reflect government
perceptions of community preferences - these
are, in fact, discretionary choices:
A Government which elects to
continue work on a domed stadium or
Expo 86 or subsidized coal exports and
to save a few thousand dollars by
cutting income support to the handicapped is making a statement about
priorities, not accepting the dictates
of some mythical resource constraint.
(Dobell 1983:7).
He extrapolates beyond the realm of government in his critique when he includes public sentiments or consumer patterns as contributing agents in the ethic of restraint:
A community which supports government action to chop support for activity centers for seniors while enjoying the second lowest income tax rates
in Canada, and one of the lowest in
the Western industrialized world, is
not responding to economic realities,
but reflecting political preferences.
(Dobell 1983:8).
In Dobell's view, the provincial govern877

ment reflects an "authoritarian centralist
fervour" in which the power of the legislature
is reduced through appeal to increased government by bureaucracy, reduced expert staff for
legislative committees and reduced access to
Such meainformation (Dobell 1983:11-19).
sures, says Dobell, amount to an entrenchment
of capital interests at the expense of any
observance of social or political pluralism.
To remove impediments to executive action and
remove barriers to the exploitation of resource or land use necessitates the weakening
of "countervailing mechanisms for expressions
of other individual or collective interests"
(Dobell 1983:19).
Through the public statements of elected
officials and the apparent lack of willingness
on the part of the B.C. government to engage
in consultation or conciliation on contentious
issues, Premier Bennett and his cabinet have
assumed an adversarial stance vis-a-vis unionists, social service advocates, and those
endorsing collectivistic principles.
In a
climate where there is a wide-spread belief
that dissent may incur the wrath of the Minister (or that of traumatized administrators
fearful for their own positions), the public
service and private agencies dependent on
public funding may become more responsive to
the political values of the Cabinet than to
the professional mandates of planners and
management personnel. According to Dobell,
the social and political fact in British
Columbia, assured through the legitimating
power of the government, is that:
the only legitimate social interaction
occurs through market transaction, and
the only legitimate power is the power
of property (Dobell 1983:20).
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Restraint and the New Right -

A Case for State

Managed Capitalism
There is a pivotal contradiction inherent
in government policies which advocate the
"privatization of services", the "filter-down"
of the public wage or "service for fee". The
contradiction lies in the fact that government, while divesting itself of the responsibility for welfare security, nevertherless
seeks to perpetuate the kinds of economic and
political relations which contribute to social
crisis and economic dysfunction. Governments
of the "right" hold that the onus for the
maintenance of social services should devolve
onto the private sector or the individual and
yet, as a body which actively seeks to legitimate social and economic relation, the State
assumes no part in fostering a social milieu
in which the private sector can develop, or is
inclined to develop this role.
In British Columbia, we see a State which
selectively "disgoverns" certain sectors of
society while actively promoting or abetting
others sectors which embody most of the redistributive injustices endemic to the polity.
In concert with these strategies, the State
which decries "big government" and bemoans
bureaucratic incursions into the private sector is actively engaged in consolidating and
centralizing its decision-making functions and
subverting normal consultative mechanisms.
Governments, such as that in B.C., are ever
more engaged in the effort to restructure the
capital dynamics of the local or national
economy. This may occur as a result of explicit policy, through tax breaks or even the
manipulation of interest rates.
Governments
may even turn "state capitalist" and seek to
employ public entrepreneurial structures to
fulfill redistributional aims. This may take
the form of state monopolies (in Canada, crown
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corporations), mega-projects, or re-development schemes. All of these have an incarnaHowever, while state investment
tion in B.C.
in "profit-making" sectors continues unabated,
social welfare expenditures decrease and a
reduced level of services contributes to a
broadening and deepening of dependency and
personal or familial crisis - clearly a contradictory consequence.
Cox (1977) makes it clear that in a capitalist state, the social welfare of the worker
depends upon the investment of capital by
capitalists. At the same time, he argues, the
investment of capital is contingent upon the
provision by the State of conditions amenable
to investment. Therefore, the social welfare
or the worker is dependent upon the provision
by the State of conditions suitable for capital investment (Cox 1977:10-11).
Taking this
analysis a step further, Broadbent (1977)
holds that the mandate of the State to maintain profits and accumulation and at the same
time manage a welfare economy often translates
into a tendency to spend more tax dollars on
the work force and less on industry.
This
leads to a dilemma in which industry and the
population each require increasing state intervention, each on their own and often contradictory terms:
one to maintain profits and
reduce costs and the other to improve living
standards and hence increase private sector
costs (Broadbent, 1977:30).
For the Social Credit government, the
dilemma is less clear. Harkening to the advice of monetarist and supply-side mentors
such as Milton Friedman and the Fraser Institute (a Vancouver based conservative economic
"think-tank"), those in government believe
that the "market" will respond to individual
needs. Others, however, regard the ideal of a
self-regulating economic system as fundament-
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ally incorrect. Gunton, for example, contends
that monetarist or supply-side approaches represent a conservative mythology (Niell
1983:2).
For Gunton, monetarist policy is one
which routes money from lower socio-economic
status (SES) groups who do not save and redirects
it to those who do save (Neill
1983:2).
This contributes to disinvestment
and increased economic marginality among the
lower SES groups and an increased polarization
of economic power in favour of capital interests.
This observation is reaffirmed by Doyle
(1979), who questions government belt-tightening measures imposed upon persons who are
least able to bear the hardships incurred
through a shrinking pool of public resources.
These persons he identifies as:
The poor, senior citizens, natives,
the unemployed, citizens in rural,
northern communities and decaying
urban areas (Doyle 1979:53).
For Doyle, many of the trends so far mentioned signal a diminishing role of the State
in the area of social policy. The concern is
that such an abdication means that, where
incongruencies arise, political interests outweighs social need in the government's scale
of priorities (Doyle 1979:53).
He suggests
that restraint economics is simply a perpetuation of the old theme that the poor have moral
defect and that the social system is sound
(Doyle 1979:54).
The neo-conservative view holds that the
welfare state retains a monopoly on welfare
services and that such a monopoly impairs the
accountability of the State to consumers
(Stoesz 1981:399). Yet the argument for privatization, as a means to reduce expenditures

and enhance consumer control over services,
illustrates yet another set of contradictions
inherent in the neo-conservative ethic. The
"new right" often claims that they wish to
"empower people" by removing the totalitarian
constraints of government or they wish to make
services more accountable to people or make
delivery more innovative through competition.
Yet in all the rhetoric, the point has been
lost that the broadening of political awareness and the ability to articulate social
concerns now enjoyed by formerly (and recently) powerless groups has been a direct result
of the enabling and redistributive legislation
of the welfare state.
The neo-conservatives do not reveal in
their rhetoric (but, one suspects are keenly
aware of) the basic postulates about the nature of power and privilege in our society.
In whose interests do recession economics act?
In the interests of those sectors of the population who receive the larger share of the
public wage - those sectors who already enjoy
positions of power and advantage.
Social Services, the State and the Imperatives
of Capital Accumulation
Throughout this discussion, we have ranged
over a number of questions and issues regarding restraint economics and social services.
We have alluded to the State and have inferred
some of its motives but to this point, we have
not addressed the State in a theoretical
sense, nor have we examined some of the
broader structural forces which impel it. In
Canada, a number of recent measures by both
the federal and provincial governments are
indicative of a concern for fiscal
restraint
and government downsizing. Most have, to some
degree, involved limitations on public sector
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wage increases and tighter controls on collective barganing and public sector job action.
Such measures, says Gordon Pape (1983),
are, in part, a response to a two decade long
period of public sector union militancy which
has won generous wage and benefit concessions
Pape
from governments (Pape 1983:88-80).
cites two percipitating events which spurred
confrontation between government and the public sector unions, both occurring in 1981.
The first was U.S. President Ronald Reagan's
firing of all U.S. Air Traffic Controllers who
refused to end an illegal strike. The second
was the beginning of the Canadian recession.
The former was suggestive of the possible
future of federal and provincial policies,
while the latter brought the social and economic problems of the nation into a much sharper political focus.
British Columbia introduced Canada's first public sector restraint
program in 1982, signalling many provinces to
follow suit (Pape 1983:89).
The emasculation
of public sector unions (long the harbingers
of union militancy) which has ensued has become a warning to the trade unions that the
State is prepared to take direct and assertive
action to achieve its goals.
How can one analyze the State as a legitimating, enabling or coercive structure?
How
and why does it act?
In their essay, "The
State In Capitalism And The Capitalist State",
Dear and Clark (1981) attempt to focus not
solely upon the functions of the State in a
given society (the State in capitalism) but
also upon the form of the capitalist State, in
other words, how a given social organization
gives rise to a particular structure or apparatus (Dear and Scott 1981:43). In so doing,
the authors refer to the "central epistemological distinction in Marxist theory" - that
between the "level of appearances" and the
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underlying social reality which gives rise to
those appearances (Dear and Clark 1981:47).
The authors outline a theory of the State
as an input-output mechanism which assumes the
role of a political entity which may at once
act in favour of crisis-free stabilization and
integration while, at the same time, "the
extended functions of the State may themselves
be a source of dysfunction and crisis" (Dear
and Clark 1981:55). In this model, the State
may assume many, often contradictory roles:
it may act in the interests of all classes of
capitalist society with many policies which do
not directly serve the interests of the capitalist class. The State, therefore, acts continually in the interests of crisis avoidance.
Crises result from class antagonisms and may
be regarded as crises of "output and input":
Output crises, relating to the
State's administrative decisions,
take the form of crises of rationality.
Input crises take the form of
crises in legitimation - the system
simply does not succeed in maintaining the necessary level of mass
loyalty (Dear and Clark 1981:56).
Current fiscal crises are intimately
linked with such crises of legitimacy and
rationality which are manifest as the contradiction between the maintenance of conditions
suitable for profitable
capital
accumulation
while at the same time seeking to mainting
social harmony (Dear and Clark 1981:56).
In
this light, the situation in B.C. may be seen
in terms of the government's restraint program
as precipitating a crisis of rationality and
the subsequent public protest and strike action forming the core of a crisis in legitimacy, for as Dear and Clark observe:
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...
the capitalist State which
openly uses its coercive power to
enable one class to profit at the
expense of others loses its legitimacy an risks undermining the basis
of mass support.
This structural
contradiction is compounded during
inflationary periods when rising
costs and public expenditure cutbacks
cause state output to fall below
expectations. A crisis in legitimacy
is thus initiated which imposes increased pressure upon the rationality
crisis, and so on (Dear and Clark
1981:56).
Richard Peet, as special guest editor of
Economic Geography (Vol. 59, No. 2, April
1983), writes in "Introduction:
The Global
Geography of Contemporary Capitalism":
The movement of capitalism into
a new phase creates crises which
interact with old crises versions of
the same contradiction, create wholly
new sequences of crisis, and intersect and interact in the ever-changing pattern of historical events
(Peet 1983:110).
Chauncey A. Alexander (summer 1982), too,
relates the effects of the recession to "reruns of the periodic crises of a capitalist
economy" (Alexander 1982:63).
Alexander regards the market-place mentality as a threat to the value system of social
welfare and, ultimately, to participatory
democracy whose goal is that of the common
good.
Accountability has shifted from the
addressing of human needs to the standards of
fiscal restraint (Alexander 1982:64).
In
Alexander's analysis, restraint emerges as a
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concise political strategem in which:
...
the reduction of social services serves several ends simultaneously.
It shrinks the sharing
requirement on private and corporate
wealth; it adds to the marginal labour pool for combatting labour demands, and it opens the door to private exploitation of social needs
(Alexander 1982:64).
Soja, Morales and Wolff (1983) contend
that structural changes in the social and
economic geography of regions has affected the
organization of the labour process, the composition of the work force, the location of
industry and the sectoral distribution of
employment (Soja et al 1983:195).
In a system which the authors typify as
"State-managed capitalism", the State facilitates the increased flexibility of capital,
allowing it to more easily mobilize cheap
labour supplies and avoid labour militancy and
organization. Commenting on the global system
of capital organization, Robert J.S. Ross
(1983) observes that the current economic
decline results from capital outflow which is
the aggregate effect of the locational decisions of firms and investors (Ross, R. 1983:
144).
Such locative decisions are influenced
by a consideration of 1) wages; 2) the discipline of the labour force; and 3) public policy perceived to be favourable to capital
(Ross, R. 1983:144).
The State reacts to the discretionary
power of capital with strategic policy designed to attract and keep investment. Ross
identifies three broad policy areas where
decisions are made which affect the positions
of labour and capital:
1) policies which
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affect the reproduction of labour through
wages and the social wage (i.e., benefits,
worker protection, legal rights - all that
comprises the social security of labour); 2)
policies intended to attract capital by the
provision of subsidies or through the provision of infrastructure; 3) tax policies and
incentives (Ross. R. 1983:146).
Ross also speculates that there is a linkage between anti-union legislation and social
service policy for:
Higher rates of unionization are
associated with public policies which
contribute to the social wage (Ross,
R. 1983:146).
Examples of this are workmens' compensation awards, employer borne insurance costs,
welfare benefits, or unemployment compensation
(Ross, R. 1983:147).
He notes also that
higher levels of social benefits contribute
indirectly to labour's ability to bargain by
providing a "social safety net". Also, such
policies contribute to a set of perceptions
which define what may be loosely called the
"business climate". In the eyes of capital,
States whose policies reflect a higher social
wage are often considered to have poor business climates.
Ross observes that nations
perceived by capital as favourable "enterprize
zones" are characterized by authoritarian
governments whose policies maintain strict
wage and labour control while offering "tax
forgiveness" and "permissive regulation"
(Ross, R. 1983:154-155).
On both the local an the national scale in
Canada, these patterns of capital mobility and
labour restructuring are evidenced in the
spatial reorganization of economic functions
in the urban, national and the supra-national
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context. Restructuring is also evidenced in
the shifting occupational hierarchy, the
"flight" of capital and the efforts of the
State to respond to capital imperatives
through legislation designed to reduce the
social wage and detract from the power base of
labour.
In this light, one may appreciate
Ross's observation that reductions in both the
personal and the social wage in the West are
induced by the control of labour in newer
industrial areas such as Singapore or Taiwan
(Ross, R. 1983:155).
It is interesting to
note, against the backdrop of restrain legislation in British Columbia, Ministers for the
government have publicly speculated about the
creation of "special enterprize zones" which
would be exempt from many restrictions on
trade as well as freedom from the strictures
of labour legislation.
Whether or not the
province has jurisdiction in this regard remains to be seen.
Conclusion:

The Problem Restated

Bruce Walker (1981) regards "welfare economics" as the study of the way in which the
economic processes of production, consumption
and exchange affect the well-being of society
(1981:13). The aim of welfare economics is to
be able to recommend courses of action which
will enhance or improve the well-being of the
members of the society and to provide criteria
by which that well-being can be judged.
Walker here draws a distinction between "positive
economics", which is essentially descriptive,
and "welfare economics", which is prescriptive
(Walker 1981:13).
There is, however, a semantic problem
which Walker identifies and that is the meaning of "social welfare" for, as he says, "social welfare may be related to the welfare of
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individuals in a variety of ways" (Walker
1981:13-14).
In other words, in whose interests, or according to what standards is social
welfare to be ascertained?
Do we adopt a
utilitarian or a humanistic view - individualist of collectivist?
The problem is compounded when we consider that both the collectivists and the anti-collectivists believe
that they are acting in the interests of the
common good. However, their philosophical and
theoretical constructions of such values as
freedom, liberty, production and well-being
may often be diametrically opposed (for a
discussion of this, see George and Wilding
1976).
It is clear, then, that political
expressions in policy and political reaction
to contingency, while they may be painted by
the State with a patina of rationality, are at
base, statements of, or judgements of values.
Commenting on what they view as
failure of the welfare state,
George
Wilding (1976) remark:

the
and

If it is to flourish, any
economic system both requires and
generates a particular value system.
Capitalism is no exception. It depends on and fosters the development
of an ethic of self-help, freedom,
individualism,
competition and
achievement - the classic liberal
values.
Such a value system, which is
required for the successful operation
of a capitalist
economy, is in clear
opposition to the values needed to
underpin a successful public welfare
system
(George and Wilding,
1976:118).
The authors assert that neither govern-
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ments nor trade unions have made the improvement of the conditions of the low-paid a top
priority of their activities (George and
Wilding 1976:113). This is because each has
inculcated a set of values which flow from the
capitalist ethic; values which are exclusive,
acquisitive and concerned with relative power.
It is for this reason that the public service
strike in B.C., and the legislation which
preceded it, acquire special significance.
According to George and Wilding:
...the framing and implementation of social policy are often subordinated to residual liberal ideas
about freedom as the absence of restraint
(George and Wilding
1976:119).
There is an abundance of prognosis about
the emerging character of post-industrial
society (Bell 1976; Trist 1968; Unger 1976)
and, while the details of these separate visions may differ, most agree that the degree
of change in our modes of socialization, political responsiveness, and the shape of our
expectations will have a resonance and a power
that will seriously shake our individual and
collective conceptions of political and social
reality. Lasch (1972) predicts that the rationalization of industry and changes in the
enterepreneurial order may give rise to a
sizable class of "new poor" who exist on the
margins of the industrial system (Lasch
1972:37). Lasch says of this group:
The new poor are not a proletariate in the strict sense because
they are not engaged in industrial
production:
instead, they constitute
a new kind of lumpenproletariate,
alienated and resentful (Lasch
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1972:37).
If this analysis is correct, then it follows that elements of society which are becoming increasingly marginal to the productive
core of the system and the State are those who
will be most often placed in circumstances of
"social risk". It also follows that, if the
State is to be at all responsive to the needs
of its citizens, not only for the present but
for the future, social monitoring and planning
structures must undergo some radicalization
which accommodates a concern for social wellbeing as well as some latitude for structural
and systemic malleability. Post-industrial
society is inherently unstable; it proceeds on
the basis of contradictions between goals and
processes whose resolution,
if left
unaddressed, at once surpresses political
expression and deepens the lines of potential
conflict with a polity. Recession economics,
as we have seen, does not seek the resolution
of societal contradictions. Rather, it is the
vehicle through which the State, as the agent
of capital, seeks to suppress conflict and
perpetuate existing inequities and, as such,
sets a dangerous and turbulent course for our
public services.
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